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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-JURY SELECTION-RESTRICTIONS ON
PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE EXTENDED TO CIVIL CASES. Fludd v.
Dykes, 863 F.2d 822 (1 1th Cir. 1989).
While attempting to take a suspected narcotics trafficker into
custody, a white Richmond County, Georgia, deputy sheriff, Frank
Tiller, shot Willie Albert Fludd, who is black. Fludd sued Tiller and
Richmond County Sheriff J.B. Dykes in federal district court,' alleg-
ing the shooting was an unreasonable seizure and a denial of substan-
tive due process.
A six-person jury chosen from a venire of fifteen persons tried the
case. The venire was divided into two groups: a group of twelve from
which the petit jury would be chosen; and a group of three from
which the one alternate juror position would be filled. Each party
could exercise three peremptory challenges to the twelve venire mem-
bers proposed for the six-person petit jury. The court allowed each
party one peremptory challenge to the three members proposed for
the alternate juror position. Defendants' counsel used two of his per-
emptory challenges to exclude blacks from the jury.
Citing Batson v. Kentucky,2 Fludd asked the trial court to require
the defendants' attorney to explain why he struck the two blacks from
the venire. The trial judge denied Fludd's request, holding that Bat-
son was "limited to criminal cases."3 To preserve the issue for appeal,
Fludd moved to discharge the panel and begin the jury selection pro-
cess anew. The trial court denied Fludd's motion. At the close of
evidence, the trial court directed a verdict in favor of Sheriff Dykes.
The jury returned a verdict in favor of Deputy Sheriff Tiller.
1. The suit was brought under 42 U.5.C. § 1983 (1982) which provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or us-
age, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. For the purposes of this section, any
Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be consid-
ered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
2. 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986) (limiting prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges in criminal
cases when the challenge is used to strike potential jurors "solely on account of their race or on
the assumption that black jurors as a group will be unable impartially to consider the State's
case against a black defendant").
3. 863 F.2d 822, 824 (11th Cir. 1989).
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Fludd appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit, contending that the defendants' use of peremptory
challenges to strike blacks from the jury denied him equal protection
of the laws guaranteed by the due process clause of the fifth amend-
ment to the Constitution.4 The Eleventh Circuit held that Batson ap-
plies in civil as well as criminal cases. Therefore, Fludd should have
the opportunity to demonstrate a prima facie case of the racially dis-
criminatory use of peremptory challenges. The court remanded the
case as to defendant Tiller5 for a determination of whether the defend-
ants purposefully discriminated against Fludd by striking members of
his race from the venire. Fludd v. Dykes, 863 F.2d 822 (11th Cir.
1989).
The first stage of any jury trial in the United States is that of jury
selection. The jury selection process generally consists of three
phases: the preparation of the jury list;6 selection of the venire;7 and
the voir dire8 process which allows both challenges for cause9 and
peremptory challenges. '0
The peremptory challenge originated in the common law of Eng-
4. Id. The fifth amendment provides: "No person shall.., be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law .... U.S. CONST. amend. V. Although the fifth amend-
ment makes no express provision regarding equal protection, the Fludd court noted that "[tihe
right to the equal protection of the laws expressed in the fourteenth amendment has been
found by implication in the due process clause of the fifth amendment, which contains no equal
protection clause." Fludd, 863 F.2d at 824 n.3 (citing Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 364
n.4 (1974)).
5. The court, without extensive discussion, affirmed the district court's directed verdict
in favor of Sheriff Dykes. 863 F.2d at 823 n.1.
6. See generally 47 AM. JUR. 2D Jury § 141 (1969).
7. The venire is "[t]he list of jurors summoned to serve as jurors for a particular term."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1395 (5th ed. 1979).
8. "The voir dire stage of the trial is intended to permit questioning of prospective jurors
as a predicate for the exercise of challenges. The purpose is to select a fair and impartial jury."
V.H. STARR & M. MCCORMICK, JURY SELECTION: AN ATTORNEY'S GUIDE TO JURY LAW
AND METHODS § 2.1.10, at 39 (1985) (footnote omitted) [hereinafter STARR].
9. A challenge for cause in general is a challenge to an individual prospective juror
in which a reason is advanced for the person's alleged disqualification. All challenges
for cause must be predicated on an express reason as to why the court should not
permit the person to sit on the jury. The object, of course, is to arrive at a fair and
impartial jury.
Id. § 2.1. 11, at 43 (footnotes omitted).
10. The peremptory challenge is "[tihe right to challenge a juror without assigning a rea-
son for the challenge." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1023 (5th ed. 1979). In contrast to the
challenge for cause, counsel may use the peremptory challenge to "strike the permitted
number of jurors simply because of disliking their looks or because a challenged juror indi-
cated some disfavor toward counsel's cause, or simply on a hunch that those jurors challenged
peremptorially would not make good jurors for counsel's side." JORDAN, JURY SELECTION
§ 4.09, at 55 (1980).
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land. 1 Its purpose was to "eliminate extremes of partiality on both
sides, [and] to assure the parties that the jurors before whom they try
the case will decide on the basis of the evidence placed before them,
and not otherwise." 2 The peremptory challenge also serves a number
of subsidiary functions.' 3 For example, peremptory challenges allow
the litigant, through counsel, to participate in the selection of an im-
partial jury by peremptorily striking the veniremen the litigant does
not like. ' Furthermore, peremptory challenges can be exercised
against individuals that counsel feels "fit common stereotypes."'
15
The courts in this country initially recognized the common law
right to peremptory challenges in United States v. Johns.16 Congress
first made statutory provision for the peremptory challenge in crimi-
nal cases in 1865,1 and extended peremptory challenges to civil cases
in 1872.18
In the modern federal system, the number of peremptory chal-
lenges allowed in a criminal case is governed by the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure and varies according to the possible punishment
for the offense. 1' In a federal civil case, statutes20 allow each party
11. Blackstone notes that:
[I]n criminal cases, or at least in capital ones, there is, infavorem vitae, allowed to the
prisoner an arbitrary and capricious species of challenge to a certain number of ju-
rors, without shewing any cause at all; which is called a peremptory challenge: a
provision full of that tenderness and humanity to prisoners, for which our English
laws are justly famous.
4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *346. For an excellent
detailed discussion of the history of the peremptory challenge, see Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S.
202, 212-21 (1965).
12. Swain, 380 U.S. at 219.
13. STARR, supra note 8, § 10.4.3, at 314-15.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 412 (Cir. Ct. Pa. 1806).
17. Act of March 3, 1865, ch. 86, § 2, 13 Stat. 500. The statute entitled the defendant to
twenty peremptory challenges and the prosecutor five in capital cases. In all other cases, the
defendant could exercise ten peremptory challenges, the prosecutor two.
18. See Act of June 8, 1872, ch. 333, § 2, 17 Stat. 282 ("[Iln all other cases, civil and
criminal, each party shall be entitled to three peremptory challenges .... ").
19. FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(b) provides:
If the offense charged is punishable by death, each side is entitled to 20 peremptory
challenges. If the offense charged is punishable by imprisonment for more than one
year, the government is entitled to 6 peremptory challenges and the defendant or
defendants jointly to 10 peremptory challenges. If the offense charged is punishable
by imprisonment for not more than one year or by fine or both, each side is entitled
to 3 peremptory challenges. If there is more than one defendant, the court may allow
the defendants additional peremptory challenges and permit them to be exercised
separately or jointly.
20. 28 U.S.C. § 1870 (1982). If the court impanels alternate jurors, each party is entitled
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three peremptory challenges, although the court has wide discretion
in limiting or expanding that number.2 1 All states provide for a simi-
lar challenge mechanism.22
The United States Supreme Court recognized long ago that
granting peremptory challenges is not constitutionally mandated.23
However, once peremptory challenges become a part of the judicial
machinery, the procedures governing their use must comport with the
Constitution. 24 In the context of discriminatorily motivated peremp-
tory challenges, the focus is upon the equal protection clause.2 5
Cases involving denial of equal protection through some phase of
the jury selection process date back to 1880 and the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Strauder v. West Virginia.26 The Court
held that a state denied a criminal defendant equal protection when it
purposefully excluded members of the defendant's race from the ve-
nire from which the defendant's petit jury was chosen. 27 A state stat-
ute provided that only white males were eligible to serve as jurors.28
An all-white jury tried and convicted Strauder, who was black, of
to additional peremptory challenges. FED. R. Civ. P. 47(b). The parties can use these addi-
tional peremptory challenges only with respect to the alternate jurors. Id.
21. E.g., Goldstein v. Kelleher, 728 F.2d 32, 37 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 852
(1984) (noting that "the trial court's discretion under the statute is considerable, [but] it is not
unlimited").
22. "State statutes and rules vary, but all states allow peremptory challenges or provide a
struck jury system in both civil and criminal cases. In most states, the number of challenges
and procedures are analogous to those in the federal system." STARR, supra note 8, § 2.1.12,
at 46 (footnotes omitted).
23. Stilson v. United States, 250 U.S. 583, 586 (1919) (nothing in the Constitution re-
quires "Congress to grant peremptory challenges .... The number of challenges is left to be
regulated by the common law or the enactments of Congress").
24. See generally S. Salizburg and M. Powers, Peremptory Challenges and the Clash Be-
tween Impartiality and Group Representation, 41 MD. L. REV. 337 (1982).
25. The application of the equal protection clause in the context of jury selection is the
subject of much commentary. See Johnson, Black Innocence and The White Jury, 83 MICH. L.
REV. 1611 (1985); Silverman, Survey of the Law of Peremptory Challenges: Uncertainty in the
Criminal Law, 44 U. PITT. L. REV. 673 (1983); Comment, Batson v. Kentucky: Equal Protec-
tion, the Fair Cross-Section Requirement, and The Discriminatory Use of Peremptory Chal-
lenges, 37 EMORY L.J. 755 (1988); Note, Rethinking Limitations on the Peremptory Challenge,
85 COLUM. L. REV. 1357 (1985); Note, Batson v. Kentucky: A Half Step in the Right Direction
(Racial Discrimination and Peremptory Challenges Under The Heavier Confines of Equal Pro-
tection), 72 CORNELL L. REV. 1026 (1987); Note, Batson v. Kentucky: The New and Improved
Peremptory Challenge, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 1195 (1987); Note, Batson v. Kentucky and the
Prosecutorial Peremptory Challenge: Arbitrary and Capricious Equal Protection?, 74 VA. L.
REV. 811 (1988).
26. 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
27. Id. at 310.
28. Id. at 305.
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murder.29 The Supreme Court held the statute unconstitutional, stat-
ing that:
[i]t is not easy to comprehend how it can be said that while every
white man is entitled to a trial by a jury selected from persons of
his own race or color, or, rather, selected without discrimination
against his color, and a negro is not, the latter is equally protected
by the law with the former. Is not protection of life and liberty
against race or color prejudice, a right, a legal right, under the
[fourteenth] amendment? And how can it be maintained that com-
pelling a colored man to submit to a trial for his life by a jury
drawn from a panel from which the State has expressly excluded
every man of his race, because of color alone, however well quali-
fied in other respects, is not a denial to him of equal legal
protection?
30
The Court's holding, precluding the purposeful exclusion of blacks
from jury service,3 has been reaffirmed on several occasions.32
Not until Swain v. Alabama,33 decided eighty-five years after
Strauder, did the Supreme Court address whether exclusion of blacks
from the petit jury through the use of peremptory challenges violated
the equal protection clause. Swain, a black man, was convicted of
rape and sentenced to death by an all-white jury.34 Although the ve-
nire included eight blacks, two were exempt and the prosecution exer-
cised peremptory challenges to strike the other six.35 The trial court
rejected Swain's motion to declare the petit jury void.36
Showing great deference to the peremptory challenge, the
Supreme Court found merit in the state's argument that the peremp-
29. Id. at 304.
30. Id. at 309.
31. The Strauder Court stressed, however, that there was no guarantee for the criminal
defendant of a right to a petit jury composed in whole or in part of persons of his own race. Id.
at 305.
32. See Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370 (1881) (state's exclusion of blacks from jury ser-
vice based upon the presumption that blacks were not qualified to sit on juries constituted
denial of equal protection rights); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 598-99 (1935) (Court
rejected as "impossible" the state's contention that no black in the county was "generally
reputed to be honest and intelligent"); Patton v. Mississippi, 332 U.S. 463 (1947) (the fact that
no black had served on a grand or petit criminal court jury in the county for more than thirty
years created a presumption of systematic exclusion); Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559, 562
(1953) (process used to select the venire which included printing the names of white persons on
white tickets and the names of black persons on yellow tickets made it "easier for those to
discriminate who are of a mind to discriminate").
33. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
34. Id. at 203.
35. Id. at 205.
36. Id. at 203.
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tory challenge "affords a suitable and necessary method of securing
juries which in fact and in the opinion of the parties are fair and im-
partial."'37  The Court maintained that subjecting peremptory chal-
lenges in a particular case to the strictures of the equal protection
clause would eliminate a "great many uses of the challenge. ' 38 The
Court recognized the "constitutional command forbidding intentional
exclusion"39 of racial groups from the jury system, but stated that
such "purposeful discrimination may not be assumed or merely as-
serted."' The Swain Court held that purposeful discrimination could
be inferred only through proof of a "systematic practice" 4' of exclud-
ing blacks through the use of peremptory challenges over an extended
period of time and in a great number of cases.4 2 Applying this newly-
stated rule, the Court found that the defendant presented insufficient
proof that prosecutors purposefully excluded blacks from petit juries
peremptorily,43 even though no black had served on a petit jury in the
county since 1950.11 A mere showing that blacks were excluded from
petit juries over a period of time was insufficient to raise an inference
of purposeful discrimination.45
The Swain standard that required the showing of a prosecutor's
systematic discriminatory use of peremptory challenges proved a vir-
tually insurmountable burden for criminal defendants. 46 Most states
37. Id. at 212. The Court also said the peremptory challenge "provides justification for
striking any group of otherwise qualified jurors in any given case, whether they be Negroes,
Catholics, accountants, or those with blue eyes." Id.
38. Id. at 222.
39. Id. at 205.
40. Id. The Court held that mere allegations that the prosecutor removed all black ve-
niremen from the jury are insufficient to overcome the presumption that the prosecutor used
the peremptory challenges for a legitimate purpose. Id. at 222. "Any other result, we think,
would establish a rule wholly at odds with the peremptory challenge system as we know it."
Id.
41. Id. at 223.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 224. The record did not demonstrate that the prosecutor had been solely re-
sponsible for excluding blacks from juries.
44. Id. at 226.
45. Id. at 227. The Court distinguished the challenge phase from the process which re-
sults in the selection of the venire. The Court stressed that selection of venires is within the
exclusive control of the state. Id. Because defense counsel participates in the challenge phase,
however, the defendant must show that it was the prosecutor who actually excluded black
jurors in a particular case or cases. "The ordinary exercise of challenges by defense counsel
does not, of course, imply purposeful discrimination by state officials." Id.
46. See, e.g., Prejean v. Blackburn, 743 F.2d 1091, 1104 (5th Cir. 1984) ("allegations of
historic parish-wide discrimination cannot substitute for the necessity of a particularized show-
ing that the prosecution has engaged in the systematic, invidious use of peremptory chal-
lenges"); Scott v. State, 479 So. 2d 1343, 1345 (Ala. Crim. App. 1985) (the presumption that
the prosecutor uses his challenges to obtain a fair and impartial jury is not overcome by testi-
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routinely disposed of defendants' attempts to establish 'Violations
under the Swain standard.47 Some states, however, relying upon both
federal and state constitutional provisions which guarantee the right
of a fair jury trial in criminal cases,48 imposed greater restrictions
upon the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges than required
by Swain.4 9
mony that the state "usually" exercises its peremptory challenges "so as to provide for a jury
without any black persons thereon"); Commonwealth v. Futch, 492 Pa. 359, 361, 424 A.2d
1231, 1232-33 (1981) (no prima facie case of systematic exclusion despite testimony from
"eighty-two witnesses, including defense attorneys, former assistant district attorneys ... two
trial judges ... and former black criminal defendants who had been convicted in jury trials" of
such consistent and systematic practices by the District Attorney's office). See also, Annota-
tion, Use of Peremptory Challenge to Exclude From Jury Persons Belonging to a Class or Race,
79 A.L.R.3d 14, 24 (1975) (in the 10 years following Swain, no defendant was able to prove
that a prosecutor used peremptory challenges to systematically exclude blacks from petit juries
over a period of time).
The Swain test was satisfied with respect to the same prosecutor in State v. Washington,
375 So. 2d 1162 (La. 1979) and State v. Brown, 371 So. 2d 751 (La. 1979).
Many commentators have criticized Swain's evidentiary burden. See Smith, Swain v. Ala-
bama: The Use of Peremptory Challenges to Strike Blacks From Juries, 27 How. L.J. 1571
(1984); Winick, Prosecutorial Peremptory Challenge Practices in Capital Cases: An Empirical
Study and A Constitutional Analysis, 81 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1982); Comment, The Cross-Section
Requirement and Jury Impartiality, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1555 (1985); Comment, The Prosecu-
tor's Exercise of the Peremptory Challenge to Exclude Nonwhite Jurors: A Valued Common
Law Privilege in Conflict with the Equal Protection Clause, 46 U. CIN. L. REV. 554 (1977);
Comment, Swain v. Alabama: A Constitutional Blueprint for the Perpetuation of the All- White
Jury, 52 VA. L. REV. 1157 (1966).
47. Justice Marshall expressed his dissatisfaction with the manner in which states summa-
rily disposed of defendants' attacks under Swain. See Gilliard v. Mississippi, 464 U.S. 867,
871-73 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). Marshall felt Swain's inter-
pretation of the equal protection clause should be overturned. Id. at 869. Others on the Court
apparently agreed with Marshall, but felt it best to allow the states the opportunity to remedy
abuses of peremptory challenges. Id. Applauding the restrictions placed on peremptory chal-
lenges by People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890, 583 P.2d 748 (1978) and
Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461, 387 N.E.2d 499, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 881 (1979),
Marshall disagreed that the United States Supreme Court should wait for other states to follow
suit. Gilliard, 464 U.S. at 870-71.
48. The Supreme Court held that the sixth amendment right to a jury trial in criminal
cases "contemplates a jury drawn from a fair cross section of the community." Taylor v.
Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 527 (1975). The sixth amendment fair cross-section requirement,
how.ever, applies only to the panel from which the petit jury is chosen. Id. at 538.
49. Reasoning that the fair cross-section requirement is meaningless unless it extends to
the petit jury, a few states have based limitations on peremptory challenges on the sixth
amendment's fair cross-section requirement and the correlative provisions in state constitu-
tions. For example, the California Supreme Court held that the fair cross-section of the venire
must "be reflected at least in some degree in the 12 persons called at random to the jury box.
It is that degree of representativeness-whatever it may prove to be-that we can and must
preserve as essential to trial by an impartial jury." People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 278, 148
Cal. Rptr. 890, 903, 583 P.2d 748, 762 (1978).
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reached a similar conclusion in Common-
wealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461, 387 N.E.2d 499, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 881 (1979). In pur-
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In Batson v. Kentucky5 ° the Court re-examined the evidentiary
burden Swain placed upon criminal defendants. In Batson the prose-
cutor used his peremptory challenges to strike all four blacks on the
venire."' The all-white jury convicted Batson, a black man, on
charges of second-degree burglary and receiving stolen goods.5 2 Bat-
son moved to discharge the jury on sixth53 and fourteenth amendment
grounds. The trial judge denied Batson's motion.54
Apparently recognizing that Swain placed an unattainable bur-
porting to follow Taylor, the court refrained "from imposing a requirement that petit juries
actually chosen 'mirror the community and reflect the various distinctive groups in the popula-
tion.' " 377 Mass. at 482, 387 N.E.2d at 513 (quoting Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 538
(1975)). Nonetheless, based solely on the Massachusetts Constitution, the court held that both
the criminal defendant and the state "are constitutionally entitled to expect . . . 'a petit jury
that is as near an approximation of the ideal cross-section of the community as the process of
random draw permits.'" 377 Mass. at 488, 387 N.E.2d at 516 (quoting People v. Wheeler, 22
Cal. 3d 258, 277, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890, 903, 583 P.2d 748, 762 (1978)). See also People v.
Thompson, 435 N.Y.S.2d 739 (App. Div. 1981); State v. Crespin, 94 N.M. 486, 612 P.2d 716
(Ct. App. 1980).
The Second and Sixth Circuits have also extended the fair cross-section requirement to
prohibit the exclusion of distinctive groups from the petit jury. E.g., Roman v. Abrams, 822
F.2d 214 (2d Cir. 1987) (reaffirming McCray v. Abrams, 750 F.2d 1113 (2d Cir. 1984), vacated
and remanded, 478 U.S. 1001 (1986) (for reconsideration in light of Batson)); Booker v. Jabe,
775 F.2d 762 (6th Cir. 1985), vacated and remanded, 478 U.S. 1001 (1986) (for further consid-
eration in light of Batson), aff'd per curiam, 801 F.2d 871 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 1046 (1987).
The majority of circuit courts, however, have refused to use the sixth amendment fair
cross-section requirement to limit peremptory challenges. See United States v. Rodriquez-
Cardenas, 866 F.2d 390 (11th Cir. 1989); United States v. Hamilton, 850 F.2d 1038 (4th Cir.
1988),petition for cert. filed, November 5, 1988; United States v. Leslie, 783 F.2d 541 (5th Cir.
1986), vacated and remanded, 479 U.S. 1074 (1987) (for consideration in light of Griffith v.
Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 (1987)), remanded, 813 F.2d 658 (5th Cir. 1987); United States v.
Brown, 770 F.2d 912 (10th Cir. 1985); United States v. Clark, 737 F.2d 679 (7th Cir. 1984);
United States v. Childress, 715 F.2d 1313 (8th Cir. 1983) (en banc), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1063
(1984); Weathersby v. Morris, 708 F.2d 1493 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1046
(1984); United States v. Canel, 708 F.2d 894 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 852 (1983).
Likewise, the Supreme Court has repeatedly refused to apply the fair cross-section requirement
to petit juries.
Limitation of the peremptory challenge based on sixth amendment grounds is discussed in
Salizburg and Powers, Peremptory Challenges and the Clash Between Impartiality and Group
Representation, 41 MD. L. REV. 337 (1982); Comment, The Cross-Section Requirement and
Jury Impartiality, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1555 (1985); Note, Limiting the Peremptory Challenge:
Representation of Groups on Petit Juries, 86 YALE L.J. 1715 (1977).
50. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
51. Id. at 83.
52. Id.
53. Id. Batson argued that the all-white jury which resulted from the prosecutor's re-
moval of all the black veniremen violated the fair cross-section requirement implicit in the
sixth amendment.
54. Id. The trial judge remarked that the parties could use their "peremptory challenges
to 'strike anybody they want to.' " Id.
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den upon his equal protection claim, Batson based his appeal to the
Supreme Court of Kentucky on his sixth amendment right to be tried
by a jury drawn from a cross-section of the community55 and the cor-
relative provision in the Kentucky Constitution. 56 In an unpublished
opinion, the Kentucky court rejected Batson's appeal.57 Although
Batson adhered exclusively to his fair cross-section argument before
the United States Supreme Court, the Court met the state's challenge
to re-evaluate Swain's evidentiary formulation." The Court agreed
that the central issue involved application of the equal protection
clause. The Court declined to address the merits of Batson's sixth
amendment argument. 9
Although not expressly overruling Swain," the Batson Court re-
jected the evidentiary burden Swain placed on the criminal defend-
ant's attempts to show purposeful discrimination through peremptory
challenges.6' Instead, the Court held that the "standards that have
been developed since Swain for assessing a prima facie case under the
Equal Protection Clause" should apply to the discriminatory use of
peremptory challenges.62
55. Batson urged the court to follow People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 148 Cal. Rptr.
890, 583 P.2d 748 (1978) and Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461, 387 N.E.2d 499
(1979).
56. Ky. CONST. of 1891 § 11 provides:
In all criminal prosecutions the accused... [cannot] be deprived of his life, liberty or
property, unless by the judgment of his peers or the law of the land; and in prosecu-
tions by indictment or information, he shall have a speedy public trial by an impartial
jury of the vicinage ....
57. 476 U.S. at 84.
58. Id. at 84-85 n.4.
59. 476 U.S. at 84-85 n.4. Although the Court says it states no view regarding the sixth
amendment argument, the Court did express its opinion regarding whether the fair cross-sec-
tion requirement should be extended to petit juries. "Indeed, it would be impossible to apply a
concept of proportional representation to the petit jury in view of the heterogeneous nature of
our society." Id. at 86 n.6. The Court first announced this rule in Taylor v. Louisiana, 419
U.S. 522, 538 (1975) (While particular groups may not be systematically excluded, there is "no
requirement that petit juries must mirror the community."). See also Lockhart v. McCree, 476
U.S. 162, 173-74 (1986) ("We have never invoked the fair cross-section principle to invalidate
the use of either for-cause or peremptory challenges to prospective jurors, or to require petit
juries, as opposed to jury panels or venires, to reflect the compositions of the community at
large."). Most recently, the Court refused to extend the fair-cross section requirement to petit
juries in Teague v. Lane, 109 S. Ct. 1060 (1989).
60. The Court did overrule Swain "[t]o the extent that anything in Swain ... is contrary
to the principles" articulated in Batson. 476 U.S. at 100 n.25.
61. Id. at 93.
62. In discussing cases involving exclusion of particular racial groups from the venire, as
distinguished from the petit jury, the Court observed that a showing of substantial under-
representation of members of a particular group over a number of cases is not the only way a
defendant can show purposeful exclusion. "In cases involving the venire, this Court has found
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Under the new standard announced in Batson, it is unnecessary
to prove a prosecutor's systematic discrimination against blacks over
a number of cases. To establish a prima facie case under Batson the
defendant need only show that the prosecutor used peremptory chal-
lenges to exclude members of the defendant's race from the petit jury,
and that all the relevant facts and circumstances raise an inference
that the prosecutor's peremptory strikes were discriminatory.63
The prosecutor must then rebut the defendant's prima facie case
with a "neutral explanation."'  The Court emphasized that the pros-
ecutor does not necessarily have to give a reason for the peremptory
challenge sufficient to justify a challenge for cause.65 The Court
stressed, however, that the mere fact that the prosecutor thinks that
prospective jurors of the defendant's race would be "partial to the
defendant because of their shared race" is insufficient to rebut a prima
facie showing of discriminatory intent.66
The Batson Court declined to address the question of whether
the restrictions placed on the prosecutor's use of the peremptory chal-
lenge also apply to the exercise of peremptory challenges by a crimi-
nal defendant. 67  The concept of equal protection limits only
governmental action; 68 when the prosecutor's peremptory challenges
are attacked on constitutional grounds, the state action requirement is
obviously satisfied.6 9 It is less obvious that the criminal defendant's
exercise of peremptory challenges involves state action. This "state
action" issue is central to the question of whether Batson-type restric-
a prima facie case on proof that members of the defendant's race were substantially under-
represented on the venire from which his jury was drawn, and that the venire was selected
under a practice providing the opportunity for discrimination." Id. at 95 (citations omitted).
63. Id. at 96. Under this totality of the circumstances standard, the defendant is entitled
to rely upon the fact that the very nature of the peremptory challenge "permits 'those to
discriminate who are of a mind to discriminate.'" Id. (quoting Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S.
559, 562 (1953)).
64. Id. at 97.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 89 n.12.
68. For example, the fourteenth amendment provides that "no State shall... deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of the law; nor deny to any persons
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (em-
phasis added). See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Serv., 109 S. Ct. 998, 1003
(1989) (The purpose of the fourteenth amendment "was to protect the people from the State,
not to ensure that the State protected them from each other.").
69. See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12.1, at 422 (3d
ed. 1986) ("actions of any governmental entity give rise to state action for purposes of constitu-
tional limitations"). In contrast, a public defender does not act under color of state law when
performing an attorney's traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal case.
Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 318-19 (1981).
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tions apply to the use of peremptory challenges in civil cases. 70
Only a handful of federal courts have addressed the issue of
whether Batson applies in civil cases.7" The issue reached the federal
appellate level for the first time72 in Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete
Co. ,'3 in which a black man sued a corporation 74 for negligence. The
defendant used two of its three peremptory challenges to exclude
blacks from the petit jury.75 The district court denied Edmonson's
request to require the defendant corporation to "articulate a neutral
explanation for the manner in which it had exercised its challenges. ' 76
70. Some states have placed restrictions on the civil litigant's use of peremptory chal-
lenges. See, e.g., Holley v. J. & S. Sweeping Co., 143 Cal. App. 3d 588, 192 Cal. Rptr. 74
(1983); City of Miami v. Cornett, 463 So. 2d 399 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985); Jackson v. Hous-
ing Authority, 321 N.C. 584, 364 S.E.2d 416 (1988).
71. Prior to Batson, at least one court held that the principles announced in Swain applied
in civil cases. See King v. County of Nassau, 581 F. Supp. 493 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (holding that
a party employing racial criteria in making peremptory challenges is not required to explain
those challenges).
In Esposito v. Buonome, 642 F. Supp. 760 (D. Conn. 1986) a circuit judge sitting by
designation refused to extend Batson to the civil defendants' use of two of their three peremp-
tory challenges to exclude the only two blacks on the venire from the petit jury. The court
reasoned that "[s]pecial concern for the plight of the accused criminal was clearly a factor in
the Batson decision." Id. at 761. The court further noted that an "important distinguishing
factor is that the complaining party in Batson was a criminal defendant, presumably haled into
court against his will. Here, the complaining party is a civil plaintiff who has chosen of his
own free will to initiate judicial process." Id. (emphasis in original).
Another judge in the same district came to the opposite conclusion in Clark v. City of
Bridgeport, 645 F. Supp. 890 (D. Conn. 1986), which involved three civil rights suits against
the city and city police officers. The defendants used their peremptory challenges "to strike
every black citizen otherwise available to serve on the juries selected in each of tbree cases."
Id. at 891. Before beginning the first of these three trials, the court required defense counsel to
give "acceptable reasons" for its challenges. Id. at 892. The court reasoned that "the constitu-
tional mandate for equal protection [applies] in civil cases where ... there is state action
involved in the exercise of peremptory challenges." Id. at 895. The court based its finding of
state action on the fact that the assistant city attorney exercised the peremptory challenges in
question. Id. at 895 n.6 (citing Columbus Bd. of Ed. v. Pencik, 443 U.S. 449, 457 n.5 (1979)).
See also Maloney v. Washington, 690 F. Supp. 687, 690 (N.D. Ill.), vacated on other grounds,
854 F.2d 152 (7th Cir: 1988) (mere use of the judicial system by private litigants is sufficient to
satisfy the state action requirement).
72. In Wilson v. Cross, 845 F.2d 163 (8th Cir. 1988), the Eighth Circuit expressed "strong
doubts about whether Batson was intended to limit the use of peremptory strikes in civil
cases." Id. at 164-65. Because the plaintiff failed to prove a prima facie case, however, the
court found it unnecessary to address the issue. The court disposed of the issue in a similar
manner in Swapshire v. Baer, 865 F.2d 948 (8th Cir. 1989).
73. 860 F.2d 1308 (5th Cir. 1988), reh'g en banc granted, January 23, 1989.
74. The other cases which address whether Batson applies in civil cases involve racially
dissimilar litigants. The court attached no significance to the fact that the defendant was not a
natural person and, therefore, a member of no particular race.
75. 860 F.2d at 1310. The defendant did not challenge Edmonson's use of all of his per-
emptory challenges to exclude whites from the jury. Id.
76. Id.
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The jury, composed of eleven whites and one black, found for Edmon-
son but ruled he was eighty percent comparatively negligent. 7 7 Ed-
monson appealed to the Fifth Circuit, asserting that Batson should
apply in civil cases and that Batson was violated by defense counsel's
exclusion of the two black jurors.7
After an extensive discussion of United States Supreme Court
cases involving the distinction between private and governmental ac-
tion, 79 the Edmonson panel held that a private litigant's use of a per-
emptory challenge involves state action. 0 The court found it
significant that peremptory challenges are conferred by federal stat-
ute."' The court further observed that "[t]he litigant exercises the
peremptory challenge, but it is the judge, acting in a judicial capacity,
who excuses the prospective juror. '"82
The Eleventh Circuit was confronted with an almost identical
situation in Fludd v. Dykes.83 Fludd, a black man, filed a section
198384 civil rights action against white defendants.8 " As in Edmon-
son,86 counsel for the defendants used two of his three peremptory
challenges to exclude prospective black jurors from the petit jury. 7
Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit's application of Batson to civil cases
turned upon a finding of state action. 8 But unlike the Fifth Circuit
panel in Edmonson, the Fludd court did not examine recent United
States Supreme Court state-action doctrine. Nor did the court discuss
Edmonson8 9 or any of the previous federal district court cases9° or
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 1311-12. The court discussed the state action inquiry the Supreme Court for-
mulated in Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 941 (1982) ("private party's joint
participation with state officials ... is sufficient to characterize that party as a 'state actor' ").
The court also discussed Tulsa Professional Collection Services v. Pope, 108 S. Ct. 1340 (1988)
(private party's use of a non-self-executing nonclaim statute constitutes state action); Burton v.
Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961) (a private restaurant's refusal to serve
blacks constituted state action where the restaurant was physically and financially an integral
part of a public building); and Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (judicial enforcement of
restrictive property covenants based on race constitutes state action).
80. 860 F.2d at 1312.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. 863 F.2d 822 (11th Cir. 1989).
84. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
85. 863 F.2d at 824.
86. 860 F.2d at 1310.
87. 863 F.2d at 824.
88. Id. at 828.
89. When Fludd was decided, the rehearing en banc in Edmonson had not yet been
granted. The court's omission of any mention of the Fifth Circuit panel's decision in Edmon-
son is interesting, since Judge John Wisdom, a senior circuit judge for the Fifth Circuit, who
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state cases9' addressing whether Batson applies in civil cases.
The court focused instead on language from the early Supreme
Court cases involving equal protection in the jury selection context. 92
Without extensive analysis, the court concluded that the state-action
requirement is satisfied by the "trial judge's decision-to proceed to
trial, over the party's objection" to the racial composition of the petit
jury.93
After finding that the equal protection clause applies to the use of
the peremptory challenge in civil case,94 the court turned its attention
to the question of whether to apply a Swain or Batson evidentiary
standard.95 Since Fludd presented no evidence that the defendants or
their attorneys had used peremptory challenges in other cases that
"deprived their black opponents of any chance of having blacks sworn
as petit jurors," 96 Fludd's equal protection claim would fail under the
Swain standard.97 The Eleventh Circuit decided, however, to adopt
the Batson approach. 98 Because the record was insufficient to make a
determination of whether Fludd had met his prima facie burden,99 the
court remanded the case for further proceedings on this issue."°
Fludd's extension of the Batson rule to civil cases seems com-
pelled once the state-action obstacle is hurdled. There is no logical
basis for concluding that racial discrimination is prohibited in the se-
lection of juries in criminal cases but permissible in civil cases.101
Nevertheless, the right to a jury trial in criminal cases has tradition-
ally been afforded greater protections than in civil cases.' 2 Thus, the
voted with the majority in Edmonson, was part of the Eleventh Circuit panel which unani-
mously decided Fludd. Wisdom authored neither opinion.
90. See supra note 71.
91. See cases cited supra note 70.
92. The court observed that "[w]hen blacks are excluded from jury service on account of
their race, the Supreme Court has long recognized that the discriminatory actor is the trial







98. The court stated there was no "distinction in harm to the individual's constitutional
rights" between criminal and civil cases. Id. at 829.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. For an excellent discussion and persuasive argument that Batson should apply in civil
cases, see Note, The Civil Implications of Batson v. Kentucky and State v. Gilmore: A Further
Look at Limitations on the Peremptory Challenge, 40 RUTGERS L. REV. 891 (1988).
102. For example, the sixth amendment guarantees the criminal defendant the right to
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sixth amendment right to jury trial in a criminal case has been
deemed "fundamental to the American scheme of justice,"10 3 and, ac-
cordingly, held binding upon the states."° Conversely, the seventh
amendment right to trial by jury in civil cases1"5 has never been ex-
tended to the states. 10 6
The especial importance of peremptory challenges in criminal
cases is reflected in the fact that more peremptory challenges are
made available to parties in criminal cases than civil cases. 107 This
suggests a societal recognition that the consequences of a criminal
trial, in terms of both degree and kind, 0 8 require more extensive pro-
tection in the jury selection process than is warranted in civil cases.
Moreover, as a practical matter, because the number of peremptories
is much more limited in civil cases, 0 9 it will be more difficult for a
litigant motivated by racial discrimination to accomplish his goal of
excluding members of a particular cognizable racial group 10 from the
jury.
The magnitude of the decision in Fludd is probably best mea-
sured in terms of its potential impact. 1 I The door is now open for a
counsel, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); the civil litigant enjoys no such parallel
right. Other distinctions include restrictions on the amendment of criminal complaints, see
United States v. Norris, 281 U.S. 619 (1930) (criminal indictment may not be amended) and
FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(e) (limitations on amendment of information in a federal prosecution),
compared with the more liberal right to amend complaints in civil cases. See FED. R. CIv. P.
15. See also Esposito v. Buonome, 642 F. Supp. 760 (D. Conn. 1986); Terrio v. McDonough,
16 Mass. App. 163, 450 N.E.2d 190, 195 (1983) (discussing reasons "why less vigorous moni-
toring of peremptory challenges might be permitted in civil cases").
103. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968).
104. Id.
105. The seventh amendment provides: "In Suits at common law, where the value in con-
troversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved . U.S.
CONST. amend. VII.
106. E.g., Alexander v. Virginia, 413 U.S. 836 (1973).
107. In criminal cases, each side is allowed 3, 6, 10 or 20 peremptory challenges, depending
on the offense charged and the possible punishment. FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(b). Only 3 peremp-
tory challenges are allowed in civil litigation. 28 U.S.C. § 1870 (1982).
108. Jail or freedom in a criminal case compared with gain or loss of property in a civil
case.
109. 28 U.S.C. § 1870 (three peremptory challenges in civil cases).
110. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96 (1986).
111. The mere fact that there are many more civil trials than criminal trials in the United
States makes Fludd's holding significant. The latest figures available show that for the twelve
month period ending June 30, 1987, U.S. District Courts heard 254,828 civil cases and 42,156
criminal cases. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF
THE UNITED STATES COURTS 169, 262 (1987). Similar disparity exists in the case loads of
state courts. In 1985, for example, state trial courts heard 7,406,610 civil cases compared to
only 1,263,802 criminal cases. NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, STATE COURT CASE
LOAD STATISTICS ANNUAL REPORT 1985 at 212 (1987).
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Batson-type challenge in any civil case in which members of "cogniza-
ble racial groups" are on different sides. The Eleventh Circuit at least
implicitly held that the use of two peremptory challenges to exclude
members of a racial group can constitute an equal protection viola-
tion. "iE Would the exclusion of just one potential juror also constitute
a violation?" 3 It would be difficult to justify drawing any kind of
meaningful line between one and two peremptory challenges. If that
line cannot be drawn, then a potential Batson claim arises in every
civil case each time a member of a cognizable racial group is excluded
by a party who belongs to a different racial group.
Fludd also affects criminal cases. Batson found state action in
the prosecutor's exercise of racially motivated peremptory chal-
lenges.' In order to extend Batson to civil cases, where peremptory
challenges are not exercised by a state agent, the Fludd court was
required to find state action in the state's overall involvement in the
process of summoning jurors and authorizing peremptory chal-
lenges, 115 as well as in the judge's toleration of the manner in which
they are exercised." 6
This may influence the resolution of an important issue un-
resolved by Batson: whether, in a criminal case, the state can raise an
equal protection challenge where the criminal defendant exercises
peremptory challenges in a racially discriminatory manner."' Fludd
suggests an affirmative answer by overcoming the expected argument
in such a case that no state action exists when the criminal defendant,
rather than the prosecutor, exercises the challenges." 8
112. Fludd, 863 F.2d at 829.
113. Presumably, this decision will be left to the discretion of the trial judge. See Batson,
476 U.S. at 97 ("We have confidence that trial judges, experienced in supervising voir dire, will
be able to decide if the circumstances concerning the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges
creates a prima facie case of discrimination against black jurors.").
114. The Batson Court referred to the "State's privilege to strike individual jurors through
peremptory challenges ...." 476 U.S. at 89 (emphasis added).
115. Fludd, 863 F.2d at 828.
116. Id.
117. The Batson Court expressed no view on whether the restrictions on peremptory chal-
lenges extend to the criminal defendant. 476 U.S. at 89 n.12.
118. Since Fludd held that the trial judge is the state actor when a party uses peremptory
challenges in a racially discriminatory manner, there is no reason the same principles would
not apply to a criminal defendant. See Note, Discrimination by the Defense: Peremptory Chal-
lenges After Batson v. Kentucky, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 355 (1988). See also State v. Alvarado,
221 N.J. Super. 324, 534 A.2d 440 (1987); People v. Muriale, 138 Misc. 2d 1056, 526 N.Y.S.2d
367, 369 (Sup. 1988).
The United States Supreme Court recently declined the opportunity to address this issue
in Alabama v. Cox, 531 So.2d 71 (Ala. Crim. App. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 817 (1989).
The defendants were Ku Klux Klan leaders on trial for the murder of a black teenager. See
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Other issues raised and left unresolved by Batson are also unan-
swered in the civil context. For example, is Batson's anti-discrimina-
tion rule applicable only to racial groups, or might it be extended to
prohibit discriminatory peremptory challenges on the basis of gen-
der,' 19 or age, or physical handicap?
The dispute regarding Batson's application to civil cases un-
doubtedly is just beginning. To date, only the Eleventh Circuit in
Fludd and the Fifth Circuit in Edmonson have addressed the issue,
and the Fifth Circuit has granted rehearing en banc in Edmonson.12 °
The issue is a likely one for review by the Supreme Court.
Mark Alan Peoples
N.Y. TIMES Feb. 2, 1988, p. 19, col. 5. The trial court denied the prosecutor's request to
prohibit defense counsel from using peremptory challenges to exclude blacks from the petit
jury. Id. In seeking certiorari, the state asked the United States Supreme Court to extend
Batson's application to defense counsel. 57 U.S.L.W. 3366 (U.S. Oct. 14, 1988). The Court
denied certiorari on January 9, 1989. 109 S. Ct. 817.
119. The only circuit that has addressed the issue has declined to extend Batson to gender-
based discriminatory use of peremptory challenges. See United States v. Hamilton, 850 F.2d
1038, 1042 (4th Cir. 1988) ("While the strictures of the Equal Protection Clause undoubtedly
apply to prohibit discrimination due to gender in other contexts, there is no evidence to suggest
that the Supreme Court would apply normal equal protection principles to the unique situation
involving peremptory challenges.").
120. A conflict between two circuits would exist if the Fifth Circuit overturns the panel's
decision in Edmonson. If this happens, the Supreme Court will be presented with an excellent
opportunity to resolve the issue, assuming the losing party in either Fludd or Edmonson seeks
certiorari.
